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WHEN, WHAT, AND WHY DO STATES 
CHOOSE TO DELEGATE? 
BARBARA KOREMENOS* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The introductory article in this symposium offers a rich conceptual 
framework for understanding international delegation. Curtis A. Bradley and 
Judith Kelley make great strides in variable conceptualization, defining and 
elaborating some key dimensions of delegation and thereby serving as a very 
useful springboard for more refined theoretical and empirical work.1 Many of 
the other articles in this symposium provide case-study evidence of delegation 
in some major agreements, with some of them richly examining the 
consequences of delegation for the implementation of the agreements.2 
Employing a random sample of international agreements, this article is the 
first systematic look at when, what, and why states choose to delegate.3 As the 
descriptive statistics below indicate, delegation is widespread, and, as the theory 
elaborated here would predict, it is more likely to be incorporated into 
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 1. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Judith Kelley, The Concept of International Delegation, 71 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Winter 2008). 
 2. See, e.g., Michael J. Tierney, Delegation Success and Policy Failure: Collective Delegation and 
the Search for Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 283 (Winter 2008). 
 3. Individual scholars know a great deal about the nature and consequences of delegation 
relationships within certain international agreements and organizations. See, e.g., Alexander 
Thompson, Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission, 60 
INT’L ORG. 1 (2006) (examining the United Nations Security Council to explain why states channel 
coercive policies through international organizations). For such consequences within certain issue 
areas, see, e.g., Lisa Martin, Distribution, Information, and Delegation to International Organizations: 
The Case of IMF Conditionality, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
(Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006); Karen J. Alter, Private Litigants and the New International 
Courts, 39 COMP. POL. STUD. 22 (2006) (showing a trend towards creating and using international 
courts); David L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney, Delegation to International Organizations: Agency 
Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform, 57 INT’L ORG. 241 (2003) (examining lending policies 
for environmentally significant projects administered through the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank). All of these scholars have gathered their own very detailed and compelling evidence 
within these agreements or organizations or within issue areas. Nonetheless, generalizing from this very 
small sample of institutionalized international cooperation and international delegation is often 
misleading. 
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agreements when states are trying to solve complex cooperation problems and 
when larger numbers of states are involved in the cooperative endeavor. 
Throughout this article, internal delegation is defined as delegation to a 
collective formed by the members of the agreement themselves, as 
distinguished from external delegation, defined as delegation to a third party 
outside of the agreement. This distinction turns out to be quite relevant. 
Other interesting, and often surprising, findings emerge. For example, given 
this initial probe into the data, delegation is evidently not limited by factors like 
hegemony or risk aversion, whereas democracy is negatively correlated with 
delegation. Additionally, this article analyzes the correlation between 
delegation and other dependent variables—that is, other institutional design 
variables that are under the control of the states making the agreement. Both 
withdrawal clauses (also known as exit or denunciation clauses) and finite 
duration provisions are significantly correlated with delegation. The positive 
correlation between withdrawal clauses and delegation suggests that states are 
minimizing their sovereignty costs by creating an outside option. The negative 
correlation between finite duration provisions and delegation suggests that 
delegation can function as a form of flexibility, thereby acting as a substitute for 
finite duration. This article confirms the importance of international delegation 
as a topic of focused study by documenting it as an important and nontrivial 
empirical phenomenon. 
The empirical work in this article is anchored in the theoretical framework 
of Rational Design.4 The starting point for Rational Design is a very simple 
observation: institutionalized international cooperation is organized in 
significantly diversified ways.5  More important, however, is the theoretical 
reason for this observation: different international institutions are solving 
different combinations of cooperation problems. This implies that differences 
among international institutions are not random; rather, states and other 
international actors shape institutions to solve the specific problems they face. 
In other words, design variations are largely the result of rational, purposive 
interactions. The goal of the Rational Design volume is to offer a systematic 
account of five design variables (membership, scope, centralization, control, and 
flexibility—the dependent variables in the framework), relating them to 
recurrent cooperation problems faced by states, the independent variables. 
This article uses Rational Design to explain the institutional-design choice 
of international delegation, where delegation is equivalent to the rational-
design variable of centralization. A state delegates functions to an international 
body if the expected benefits from delegation outweigh the expected costs. 
 
 4. See generally Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 
INT’L ORG. 761 (2001) (elaborating the theory of Rational Design as applied to international 
organizations). 
 5. Included in institutionalized international cooperation are any explicit arrangements, 
negotiated among international actors, that prescribe, proscribe, or authorize behavior; thus this 
includes the over 50,000 international agreements that are registered with the United Nations. 
06__KOREMENOS.DOC 6/9/2008  8:04:12 AM 
Winter  2008] WHEN STATES DELEGATE 153 
Empirically, the extent and type of delegation should vary according to the 
importance of delegation in solving the particular cooperation problems faced 
by states. From this perspective, the debate on whether delegation is an 
important part of international law (not the perspective emphasized in this 
special issue) is misplaced. A more fine-grained theory predicts that delegation 
is important when the underlying cooperation problem requires it. 
Rational Design theory is sketched out in Part II. The data are presented in 
Part III, followed by a detailed set of descriptive statistics in Part IV. The theory 
is then tested in Part V, and Part VI concludes and points to new directions for 
research once more data are collected. 
II 
RATIONAL DESIGN THEORY 
Given its primacy in Rational Design theory, what exactly is a cooperation 
problem? One way of conceptualizing the notion is to focus on the categories of 
interests and constraints. Interests are captured in two of the Rational Design 
independent variables, with the enforcement problem referring “to the strength 
of individual actors’ incentives to cheat”6 and the distribution problem 
depending “on how each actor compares its preferred alternative to other 
actors’ preferred alternatives.”7 Constraints are captured with variables 
(italicized below) that address both information and beliefs: uncertainty about 
preferences (that is, uncertainty regarding what the other state partners’ 
preferences are), uncertainty about behavior (not being able to decipher easily 
whether the other state partners are cooperating or defecting), and uncertainty 
about the state of the world (that is, uncertainty regarding the consequences of 
cooperation—who will benefit the most, et cetera). To these, a few more 
variables can be added, including the commitment problem (defined as a 
domestic commitment problem or a time-inconsistency problem).8 
With respect to international delegation, the set of rational-design 
conjectures surrounding the dependent variable centralization (defined as 
whether institutional tasks are performed by a single focal entity or not) are 
pertinent.9 Of sixteen suggested univariate10 conjectures relating one 
 
 6. Koremenos et al., supra note 4, at 776. 
 7. Id. at 775. 
 8. Barbara Koremenos, THE CONTINENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007) [hereinafter 
KOREMENOS, CONTINENT]. In CONTINENT, I add the following possible cooperation problems: 
encouraging positive externalities, discouraging negative externalities, deadlock, and “other.” The 
other category includes areas of cooperation such as foreign aid for which there are no or few strategic 
considerations and pure coordination games without uncertainty. More than one answer can be chosen 
for each agreement. In CONTINENT and in Barbara Koremenos, If Only Half of International 
Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 
189 (2007) [hereinafter Koremenos, Which Half?], multiple examples of the operationalization of these 
cooperation problems are given, as well as elaboration on how they were coded. 
 9. Given that all the agreements in the sample include at least two state actors, whenever tasks 
are performed by a single focal actor, the states are delegating. 
 10. In univariate analyses, each variable in a data set is analyzed separately. 
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independent variable to one dependent variable, four conjectures involve 
centralization.11 Three of the four stipulate some aspect of the cooperation 
problem the states are facing as the independent variable: Centralization 
increases with the severity of the enforcement problem, with uncertainty about 
behavior, and with uncertainty about the state of the world.12 The fourth 
conjecture is a transactions-cost argument: Centralization increases with 
number, where number can capture the literal number of states or their 
heterogeneity, or both.13 
To elaborate a bit on the underlying logic of these conjectures, consider the 
following: Uncertainty about the behavior of states engaged in a cooperative 
endeavor can be reduced by developing centralized monitoring systems, 
whereas uncertainty about the state of the world can be partially offset by the 
pooling of information, which is often done most efficiently through delegation. 
When enforcement problems are present, some kind of delegated punishment 
(for example, through a body like the Security Council) can help deter the 
problem of cheating. States facing internal commitment problems, perhaps 
because of a tumultuous recent political history, can often more easily commit 
credibly to cooperative endeavors if they delegate some authority to a third 
party. Essentially, when cooperation problems are complex (here including 
enforcement problems and commitment problems as well as uncertainty about 
behavior and the state of the world), delegation helps states solve the problem 
or problems more efficiently.14 Regarding the transaction-costs conjecture, when 
heterogeneity is high, routine administration and decisionmaking is complicated 
among the participants; delegating some of those tasks can be efficient. 
Similarly, increasing the number of participants increases the transaction costs 
of implementing an international agreement; once again, delegation may be the 
efficient choice, allowing states to more easily coordinate their actions. 
Rational Design does not distinguish between external and internal 
delegation, but according to its logic, one could argue that, if it is in states’ 
interests to delegate, the larger and more heterogeneous the membership, the 
more likely it is that external delegation will be chosen. Externally delegating to 
a preexisting third party saves on the transaction costs of creating a new body 
and, more importantly, allows states to bypass the costly decisionmaking that is 
characteristic of large and heterogeneous groups. Additionally, external bodies 
 
 11. Koremenos et al., supra note 4, at 787–91. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. Specifically, the variable number can capture asymmetries with respect to both power and 
interests. In the empirical analyses below, number, power, and heterogeneity of interests are included 
as separate variables. 
 14. Cooperation problems not included in the category of complex problems include encouraging 
endeavors with positive externalities, discouraging those with negative externalities, and solving 
coordination games. Though uncertainty about preferences could be considered a complex problem, 
few if any of the agreements in the sample have that as one of their underlying problems, which is 
interesting in and of itself. See Koremenos, CONTINENT, supra note 8. 
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may be more objective and neutral, and hence they may be better equipped to 
come up with solutions that are acceptable to heterogeneous treaty members. 
Many argue that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are increasingly 
important to international cooperation, particularly in the fields of the 
environment and human rights.15 It is worth considering explicitly what 
delegation to NGOs looks like, how it works, and what advantages it may 
provide to states. Rational Design suggests that states would choose to delegate 
functions to NGOs—instead of to an internal body or an IGO (which is also 
composed of states)—only if there is some explicit advantage to such 
delegation. Preliminary research on selective NGO participation appears to 
confirm this conjecture. “Nongovernmental organizations . . . are increasingly 
important participants in international environmental institutions,” especially as 
these delegation agreements become more and more complex.16 Kal Raustiala 
has argued that the choice of states to give a role to NGOs  is “based on the 
confluence of governmental incentives and NGO comparative advantages and 
resources.”17 NGOs have even begun to take over what were traditionally 
“states-only” activities.18 Delegation to an NGO, particularly for functions like 
compliance monitoring and dispute resolution, may increase the impartiality of 
such processes and thus enhance the overall effectiveness of the agreement.19 
NGOs may be able to serve this function through the links they create between 
local and global needs and actors.20 But they may also focus exclusively on 
compliance by their own governments or have very limited access to the 
information they need to make accurate and consistent judgments.21 
III 
DATA 
The data used in this article are drawn from the United Nations Treaty 
Series.22 This database features the most comprehensive set of formal 
 
 15. See, e.g., Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY 
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS passim (1998) (arguing that NGOs have made an impact in 
human rights and environmental politics by bringing attention to particular issues and changing states’ 
perceptions of their national interests). 
 16. Kal Raustiala, States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions, 41 INT’L STUD. Q. 
719, 732–33 (1997). 
 17. Id. at 720. 
 18. Id. at 719. 
 19. Id. at 728–30. 
 20. Thomas Princen & Matthias Finger, ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS IN WORLD POLITICS 33 (1994). 
 21. Oliver Meier & Clare Tenner, Nongovernemental Monitoring of International Agreements, in 
VERIFICATION YEARBOOK 207, 217 (Trevor Findlay ed., 2000). 
 22. United Nations Treaty Collection, http://untreaty.un.org/English/access.asp (last visited Jan. 28, 
2008). The data are gathered as part of a research project supported by the National Science 
Foundation CAREER Award: “Designing International Agreements: Theoretical Development, Data 
Collection, and Empirical Analysis” (SES-0094376). The Internet collection at the time the sample was 
drawn contained over 34,000 international agreements “which have been published in hard copy in over 
1,450 volumes, which corresponds to all treaties and subsequent actions registered up to December 
1986.” Id. 
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international agreements concluded since the end of World War II as well as 
many agreements initiated in earlier periods, in particular those registered with 
the League of Nations. Unlike many databases that feature agreements from 
one country or region, which are either multilateral or bilateral, and which 
surround one issue area, like the environment, this database transcends the 
number and identity of parties, and the agreements it contains are divided into 
a number of issue areas. The random sample used here is conditional on four 
issue areas: economics, environment, human rights, and security. It includes 
both multilateral and bilateral agreements.23 
Inclusion in the sample required that at least two state parties be involved, 
thereby eliminating any bilateral agreements between only one state and an 
international organization. With respect to Figure 1, “The Delegation Chain,” 
found in the Bradley and Kelley article,24 the theories and data in this article are 
focused on delegations from the left-hand column to the middle column, 
although some agreements will mention redelegation from the collective body 
formed by the agreement to a third party. For example, in the American 
Convention on Human Rights, Pact of San José, Costa Rica (San José Pact),25 
two internal bodies are created: the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The tasks delegated to 
these bodies represent internal delegation. However, Article 40,26 which 
describes the role and functions of the Commission, mentions what Bradley and 
Kelley would call redelegation27 from the Commission to the preexisting 
Secretariat of the Organization of American States: the “Secretariat services for 
the Commission shall be furnished by the appropriate specialized unit of the 
General Secretariat of the Organization. This unit shall be provided with the 
resources required to accomplish the tasks assigned to it by the Commission.”28 
Hence this agreement includes both internal delegation and external delegation 
(accomplished through redelegation). 
A coding instrument records the characteristics of the agreements. 
Importantly, the coders for this project are extensively trained in order to give 
them high levels of both competency and consistency, with the majority going 
through nine to twelve months of course-based training that includes both 
theoretical training and practice coding runs. Two coders independently code 
 
 23. In the sample used for this article, sixty-four of the ninety-seven agreements are bilateral. The 
reason for this is that bilateral cooperation is far more prevalent than multilateral cooperation. For 
example, at the time the sample was drawn, the online version of the UNTS contained 2,330 
multilateral agreements and 32,936 bilateral agreements. Nothing about the design of the data-
collection project precludes it from including other issue areas; the four chosen are included because 
they are currently the most important in the international cooperation literature. See the Appendix for 
a list of the set of agreements used in the empirical analyses. 
 24. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 1, at 6. 
 25. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Pact of San José, 
Costa Rica, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144 [hereinafter San José Pact]. 
 26. Id. at 154. 
 27. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 1, at 6. 
 28. San José Pact, supra note 25, at 154. 
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each agreement using an online survey instrument. Upon completion, an 
intercoder-reliability report is generated for the 375 questions for which there 
are “quantitative” answers, for example, yes or no, multiple choice, or a specific 
number. The average coded agreement is characterized by disagreement on 
approximately fifteen questions, or four percent of the quantitative questions; 
the range so far has been between two percent and fifteen percent. The 
inconsistencies are then resolved through a close rereading of the agreement 
and supervised discussion involving the original coders, a trained graduate 
student, and the author. 
One of the most extensive sections of the coding instrument is that which 
addresses the bodies (if any) created by the agreement. These bodies are 
usually composed of some kind of representative of the member states, but they 
can also be composed of experts chosen by the members. Because they are new 
bodies created by the agreement, they are a form of internal delegation. A 
shorter section of the coding instrument addresses tasks delegated to third 
parties and asks about the kind of tasks delegated as well as what kind of third 
party is implicated. This section captures external delegation. Hence, what the 
distinction is capturing is whether new bodies are created or existing ones are 
used.  
In their concept article, Bradley and Kelley also include both internal and 
external delegation in their definition of international delegation.29 Within their 
framework, internal delegation would be delegation to a collective body or 
subgroup of states within the agreement (what some call a pooling of 
sovereignty), while external delegation would include delegation to a third 
party outside of the agreement.30 In Figure 1, internal delegation encompasses 
the first two rows of the middle column while external delegation includes the 
bottom row in Bradley and Kelley’s article. In principle, each of the possible 
tasks delegated can be through either internal or external delegation. For 
example, in the data presented here, the secretariat function is sometimes 
handled through internal delegation and sometimes through external (and, of 
course, sometimes not delegated at all), as the first two columns of Table 1 
illustrate. 
To help bring these two concepts to life, consider the following agreement 
from the random sample. In an investment agreement between the United 
Kingdom and Egypt, the states must submit their dispute to an arbitral body if 
they cannot settle it diplomatically.31 The members of this body are chosen by 
the disputing states, but if they cannot find mutually acceptable members, the 
selection process is turned over to an external source, either the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes or the International Court of 
 
 29. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 1, at 3–9. 
 30. Id. at 6. 
 31. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.–Egypt, June 11, 1975, 1032 
U.N.T.S. 32. 
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Justice.32 Thus, the arbitral body is usually internal, but if the members cannot 
agree, it becomes external. The arbitral body listens to arguments, considers the 
facts, and, in this case, makes binding recommendations to resolve the dispute.33 
Once a body has been identified as internal, the coders are asked to identify 
in detail the characteristics of the members, the procedures for making 
decisions, and other details about the functioning and purpose of the body, 
including what tasks are delegated to it. The list of possible delegated tasks 
appears in Table 1 below.34 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. This is one of the most “controversial cases” of internal delegation because it could be claimed 
that, when disputing members must each choose an arbitrator to form a panel, these arbitrators are 
neutral third parties. Nonetheless, they could just as easily be retired judges from the member states 
and hence biased. The conceptualization of internal delegation in this hardest case stems from the 
assumption that the units of analysis that bargain or negotiate at the international level are the states—
not the governments within those states. The unitary-actor assumption is a good baseline as well as a 
focal point. Although it is known that domestic politics implies that it is not always the case that the 
state should be modeled as unitary, it becomes very difficult in reading agreements to ascertain which 
level of the state is the one bargaining, influencing, being influenced, et cetera. There is simply not 
enough detail in agreements to discover such things. In contrast, the state is a salient unit. Given this, 
whenever a body is (or is likely to be) composed of some representative of at least some of the member 
states, this body is coded as internal—that is, a body created by the agreement and, hence, a form of 
internal delegation. For example, suppose that when Bolivia and the United States need to arbitrate a 
dispute, two very professional lawyers, one from the United States and one from Bolivia, with 
international reputations for being fair, are appointed as the arbitrators. If the government were used 
as the unit of analysis, this would be external delegation because the lawyers do not represent the 
governments. But given the assumption that the nation-state is the unit of analysis, the lawyers are 
citizens of the disputing parties as well as experts. Hence, this is a case of internal delegation. Other 
than the delegation of certain dispute resolution, all other forms of internal delegation are clear-cut 
examples of collective bodies or subgroups of states. 
 34. See Barabara Koremenos, Glossary: Delegated Tasks, 
http://sitemaker.umich.edu/koremenos/files/glossary_-_delegated_tasks_jan08.doc (last visited Feb. 6, 
2008) for a definition and example of each of the tasks listed in Table 1. 
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IV 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This part presents a first look at the landscape of delegation across the ran-
dom sample of agreements. Figure 1 shows the incidence of delegation and 
whether it is internal, external, or both. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One of the most striking things about Figure 1 is how widespread delegation 
is, with over half of the international agreements calling for it in some form or 
another. About the same number of agreements call for internal and external 
delegation, with the use of both in a single agreement being somewhat less 
common but certainly not negligible. This is not surprising, given that there are 
costs to creating bodies as well as to delegating to existing ones; hence, states 
may have an incentive to choose the form of delegation selectively. It is also 
notable that although external delegation is often cited as having higher 
“sovereignty costs,” or as placing higher constraints on signatory states, at first 
glance the data above do not suggest that states are any less likely to use 
external delegation. This suggests that perhaps external delegation is not 
viewed by states in such terms, but instead is seen as being the more effective 
form of delegation in many cases. Of course, any firm conclusions must take 
into account just what gets delegated internally versus externally. 
Although all of these third parties are preexisting intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs), in six agreements in the sample, NGOs are mentioned as 
well. Given the field’s interest in the role of nonstate actors, it is worth looking 
at what delegation to NGOs looks like in the random sample. Out of those six 
agreements that delegate functions to NGOs, four are in the area of human 
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rights. In the San José Pact, signatory states give an NGO the authority to bring 
a petition against a signatory state if the NGO believes that a violation has 
occurred.35 Specifically, the Pact calls on “[a]ny person or group of persons, or 
any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more member states of 
the Organization” to “lodge petitions with the Commission containing 
denunciations or complaints of violation” of the Convention.36 
Similarly, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms delegates compliance-monitoring functions to an 
NGO.37 Article 25 notes that 
[t]he Commission may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary-General of the 
Council of Europe from any persons, nongovernmental organisation or group of 
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting 
Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention, provided that the High Contracting 
Party against which the complaint has been lodged has declared that it recognizes the 
competence of the Commission to receive such petitions.38 
The agreement therefore gives NGOs the authority to monitor state compliance 
with the agreement and to bring petitions against noncompliant states when 
appropriate. 
 
Figure 2 shows the incidence of delegation by issue area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cooperation without delegation is most common in the security and 
economic issue areas. For security agreements, this descriptive statistic seems to 
 
 35. San José Pact, supra note 25, at 155. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 222. 
 38. Id. at 236–38. 
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confirm the conventional wisdom that states may be less willing to turn issues 
pertaining to national security over to an international body. With respect to 
economic agreements, an inverse relationship between precision and delegation 
can be expected, and economic agreements are, on average, far more precise 
than agreements in any of the other three issue areas. 39 Cooperation without 
delegation is least likely in human rights. Moreover, and interestingly, human-
rights agreements never incorporate internal delegation solely; rather, they 
either delegate only to third parties or they create an internal body and delegate 
to a third as well. This is not surprising, given that human-rights agreements 
tend to govern internal affairs; hence, delegation to a third party may enhance 
credibility. 
These simple, descriptive statistics open up a set of questions regarding the 
role of the existing international environment—most importantly, existing 
institutions—in the formation of new agreements and the process of delegation. 
The formation of new international law is often an iterative process, with states 
building off of old institutions to adapt to their new needs. 
The types of delegated authority discussed by Bradley and Kelley can 
include functions that represent a substantial delegation of authority. These 
include, for example, legislative tasks such as the power to amend treaties and 
mandate compliance, adjudicative tasks such as the settlement of disputes, and 
compliance-monitoring and enforcement, such that the body to which power is 
delegated works to enforce the treaty either through centralized investigations 
or more locally through peer pressure. The delegated bodies are used for less-
central tasks as well, for example, to create administrative rules to implement 
the treaty, set the agenda for the organization, and provide research and 
advisory support.40 Table 1 shows what kinds of tasks are actually delegated 
across the random sample of agreements. Although the list of tasks does not 
overlap entirely with Bradley and Kelley’s, it includes many of the same types 
of functions and levels of delegation, including high levels of delegation, such as 
compliance monitoring, dispute settlement, and enforcement, as well as 
delegation of less central tasks such as administrative functions, the drafting of 
rules to ease implementation, and information dissemination. 
 
 39. Barbara Koremenos, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RULEMAKING (2007). 
 40. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 1, at 10–16. 
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Table 1: Tasks Delegated to Institutions 
 
Number of Agreements Using 
Tasks Delegated 
Internal Delegation 
External 
Delegation 
Number of 
Agreements that 
Delegate Same 
Task to New and 
Existing 
Institutions 
Figurehead (no real 
substantive role or 
duty, but a 
ceremonial role) 
0 0 0 
Secretariat or 
Administrative 
Duties 
8 10 2 
Financial 
Administration 
7 3 0 
Representing the 
International 
Organization in its 
Interactions with 
Countries or Other 
Organizations 
5 0 0 
Collection of 
Information 
9 7 1 
Collation of 
Information 
6 1 0 
Analysis of 
Information 
11 1 0 
Dissemination of 
Information 
12 6 1 
Making Rules or 
Laws in Addition to 
Those Stipulated in 
the Agreement 
10 0 0 
Having a Role in 
Amending the 
Agreement 
4 4 1 
Having a Role in 
Implementing the 
Agreement’s Rules 
or Law 
10 6 1 
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Vetoing Rules or 
Decisions Made by 
Another Body 
0 0 0 
Presiding Over, 
Setting the Agenda 
for, or Overseeing 
the Reports of 
Some Other Body’s 
Meetings 
7 1 0 
Deciding which 
New Members May 
Join 
1 1 0 
Granting 
Exceptions Under 
an Escape Clause 
0 0 0 
Monitoring 
Compliance 
8 9 2 
Soft Procedures to 
Encourage 
Compliance, like 
Review Meetings 
5 4 0 
Overseeing 
Complaint(s) and 
Punishment(s) for 
Noncompliance 
6 6 1 
Having a Role in 
Dispute Resolution 
27 30 19 
Redistributing 
Property Rights 
0 1 0 
Assigning New 
Property Rights 
0 0 0 
Addressing New, 
Nonredistributive 
Issues 
0 0 0 
Rights of Residual 
Control 
0 0 0 
Other 8 8 2 
Sample Size = 97 
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As the table indicates, dispute resolution is the most commonly delegated 
function, both internally and externally.41 External delegation of dispute 
resolution usually involves delegating authority to an existing arbitration 
tribunal or an international court. 
For tasks other than dispute resolution, some facet of the implementation of 
the agreement, as well as the analysis and dissemination of information, are the 
tasks most often internally delegated. Tasks related to the monitoring and 
punishment of noncompliers are also at times delegated, suggesting that 
internal delegation may be an important enforcement tool as well. It is also 
worth noting that the task of making laws in addition to those stipulated in the 
agreement is internally delegated in about ten percent of the agreements and is 
never externally delegated. This strongly suggests that states want to retain 
control over the evolution of their cooperation and are not apt to delegate such 
tasks to a third party. Secretariat and administrative duties, collection of 
information, compliance monitoring, and punishment for noncompliance are 
the tasks that are most frequently externally delegated. In fact, ten percent of 
the agreements delegate monitoring functions to an external body. Significantly, 
the table shows that delegation is used for a wide range of tasks, tasks that are 
important and in some cases essential to the functioning of agreements. Indeed, 
delegated bodies are involved in the implementation, revision, and monitoring 
of the agreement and often have the power to settle disputes and enforce 
compliance. The actions of delegated bodies in these functions will have real 
effects on signatory states. 
Given the statistic in Figure 1—that about thirty percent of the agreements 
use both internal and external delegation—the third column of Table 1 delves 
into whether a redundancy is built into some agreements, or whether different 
tasks are delegated internally and externally. 
Delegation of the same tasks to new and old institutions is not all that 
common, except in dispute resolution, when it occurs for about twenty percent 
of the agreements in the sample. It is likely that most of these cases are ones in 
which dispute resolution is first delegated to an internal body and then to an 
external body only if no agreement can be reached at the first stage. One 
example in which the same (nondispute resolution) functions are delegated to 
new and old institutions is the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 
 
 41. In her contribution to this volume, Karen Alter elaborates four roles that a judiciary can take: 
dispute resolution, administrative review, enforcement, and constitutional review. Karen Alter, 
Delegating to International Courts: Self-Binding vs. Other-Binding Delegation, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 37 (Winter 2008). Thus far in the random sample, only one agreement has actually created a 
court: The San José Pact created the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which has constitutional 
review and dispute resolution capabilities (adjudication). The court does not have enforcement 
capabilities; it can only make recommendations on “binding” rulings (rulings are only binding if 
member states recognize the jurisdiction of the court). Therefore, with that one exception, whenever a 
court, such as the ones Alter analyzes, is mentioned in the agreement, it is called upon to help with 
dispute resolution between the parties to some other agreement, with none of the other functions being 
mentioned. 
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Latin America (the Tlateloco Treaty).42 This agreement delegates compliance 
monitoring internally to the “Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 
Latin America” (OPANAL), and externally to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA).43 OPANAL is given the responsibility of holding 
“periodic . . . consultations” among member states on matters relating to 
member compliance and obligations.44 The IAEA is tasked with conducting 
special investigations of member-state activity when necessary or when 
requested by another signatory.45 Initially, both OPANAL and the IAEA were 
given this responsibility, but following a 1992 amendment, only the IAEA 
retains it. By delegating compliance monitoring to both internal and external 
bodies, states may have hoped to combine the state control provided by internal 
delegation with the “teeth” afforded by having an external body involved. What 
they learned, perhaps, is that, in this case, the external body provided the 
needed credibility. 
The next issue, relationships between voting rules and internal delegation, is 
significant because it relates to the autonomy of the international body as well 
as to the costs states face when they delegate authority. The autonomy of a 
body, Bradley and Kelley suggest, is determined by the level of state oversight, 
including the reporting requirements of the body, the precision of the body’s 
mandate, the decisionmaking procedures of the body (for which unanimous 
processes reduce the body’s independence), the permanence of the body, and 
the mechanism through which the body gets its funding.46 The analysis of voting 
rules here captures the decisionmaking-procedure aspect of Bradley and 
Kelley’s autonomy concept. Bodies that have voting rules requiring unanimity 
(“unanimity rules” or “unanimity voting”) are likely to have lower levels of 
autonomy than those with some type of majoritarian voting rules. Similarly, 
bodies that require supermajorities may have less autonomy than those that 
need only simple majorities. The level of autonomy given to the international 
body, Bradley and Kelley note, will also affect the cost of delegating authority.47 
When states continue to control the body to which power is delegated, the cost 
of delegation remains low and they are not forced to compromise on their 
preferred policy all that much.48 However, when the body is given substantial 
independence, states sacrifice more of their individual autonomy through the 
delegation of authority and may be forced to accept policies that vary drastically 
from their ideal.49 By considering how voting power is distributed, the analysis 
of voting rules here sheds light on the costs of delegation, probing not only 
 
 42. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 
326. 
 43. Id. at 334, 340. 
 44. Id. at 334. 
 45. Id. at 342–44. 
 46. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 1, at 20. 
 47. Id. at 28–30. 
 48. Id. at 30 
 49. Id. at 28. 
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whether states rely more heavily on unanimity or majority voting in their 
delegation, but also whether weighted or one-vote-per-member voting rules are 
used in those cases where majority voting is permitted. In other words, do the 
rich and powerful control the delegation more? 
It may be also be the case that unanimity voting rules are more common in 
instances of delegation in specific issue areas—for example, security—or when 
the delegation includes certain types of functions—for example, imposing 
sanctions or amending the treaty. If powerful states rely on weighted voting to 
control their delegation, not only will the delegated body have less 
independence overall, but the autonomy costs50 may also be lower for these 
powerful states than for smaller signatory nations. More specifically, we can see 
whether agreements involving superpowers are more likely to have asymmetric 
voting rules for any internal bodies. If this is the case, it would suggest that 
powerful countries do carefully protect their autonomy when allowing 
delegation. Findings suggesting that states do guard their delegation would not 
necessarily imply delegated bodies are weak, but rather that state actors use 
delegation as a tool to advance their interests but are careful not to let it get out 
of hand. 
 
Table 2: Voting Rules for Internal Delegation 
 
 Number of Bodies 
Unanimity Required 4 
Simple Majority 21 
Super Majority 3 
Special Majority 0 
Varies Depending on Issue 4 
Not Specified 24 
Sample Size = 56 
 
 
 50. Autonomy costs are defined by Bradley and Kelley. Id. 
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Table 3: Determination of Representation for Internal Delegation 
 
 Number of Bodies 
Fixed Number of Representatives per State 28 
Number of Representatives Proportional to 
Member State’s Population 
0 
Number of Representatives Proportional to 
Member State’s Financial Contribution 
0 
Number of Representatives Determined by 
some Other Characteristic (for example, 
geography, dispersion, nuclear status) 
0 
Other 18 
Not Specified 11 
Sample Size = 56 
 
Table 4: Allocation of Votes for Internal Delegation 
 
 Number of Bodies 
One per Member State 20 
Number of Votes Proportional to Member 
State’s Population 
0 
Number of Votes Proportional to Member 
State’s Financial Contribution 1 
Number of Votes Determined by Some Other 
Characteristic (for example, geography, 
dispersion, nuclear status) 
2 
Other 3 
Not Specified 25 
Sample Size = 51 
 
The tables above indicate, first, that the large majority of internally delegated 
bodies have a fixed number of representatives per nation state and voting rules 
that allow one vote per member state, and, second, that unanimity voting rules 
are rare (less than ten percent of the bodies). This suggests that such bodies are 
not dominated by certain states (for example, large powers) and that, at least 
for internal delegation, states do not often guard their delegation with 
unanimity or weighted voting. These descriptive statistics support the argument 
that delegated bodies are given the autonomy to take real action and thus can 
have real effects on signing states. 
Further, probes into the data suggest that there is a negative relationship 
between the inclusion of a unanimity rule and the agreement issue areas of 
security, environment, and human rights. The results do not approach statistical 
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significance, however. In economic issue areas, there is a positive relationship 
with the inclusion of a unanimity rule, a result that is significant at the 0.10 
level. For types of functions that are delegated to internal bodies, there is a 
positive relationship between the delegation of dispute-resolution functions and 
the use of a unanimity rule. This result is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels (p=0.1488). There is also an inverse relationship between 
the inclusion of unanimity rules and the delegation of amendment functions as 
well those of overseeing complaints and punishments, but they are not 
statistically significant. 
Finally, the relationship between whether a superpower is a member and the 
use of weighted voting depends on how weighted voting is coded. When, in the 
table, other types of voting-allocation rules are coded as weighted voting, the 
relationship between weighted voting and superpower membership in the 
agreement is statistically significant and positive. This suggests that when either 
the United States or (the former) USSR is a signatory to an agreement, it is 
likely to seek out weighted voting rules. (However, when other types of voting- 
allocation rules are coded as either not weighted or as missing data, the 
relationship between the presence of a superpower party to the treaty and 
weighted voting is not statistically significant. This may be a result of a very 
small group of agreements that have any weighted voting, by any coding 
scheme. When other is coded as weighted, only three agreements create bodies 
with weighted voting; when other is either coded as not weighted or as missing 
data, the number of agreements with weighted voting is only one.) 
V 
FINDINGS: WHEN IS DELEGATION MOST LIKELY? 
Rational Design theory calls attention to a set of independent variables 
whose presence would increase the likelihood that states incorporate some kind 
of delegation into their agreements.51 The subsections that follow address each 
of these variables. Because these data are new, I discuss the probits one variable 
at a time before turning to the multivariate analysis below. 
A. Delegation and the Complexity of the Cooperation Problem 
Dispute-resolution provisions are much more common in agreements that 
deal with complex cooperation problems.52 The explanation for this variation in 
dispute-resolution provisions based on Rational Design theory is that states 
rationally include dispute-resolution provisions only when they expect that such 
provisions will be needed in the future. (Recall that each of the problems 
included in the variable complex cooperation problem calls for centralization to 
help solve the problem.53) In signing agreements with more complex 
 
 51. See supra Part I. 
 52. Koremenos, Which Half, supra note 8, at 189. 
 53. See supra Part II. 
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cooperation problems, states are likely to anticipate future disagreements, and 
rightly so, and more likely to see dispute-resolution provisions as necessary. 
This explanation is strongly supported in the statistical analyses presented here. 
When the delegation is broadened to include all forms of delegation, not 
just dispute resolution, both external and internal delegation appear to be more 
common when there are complex cooperation problems (see Table 5). When 
states are forced to overcome complex cooperation problems, they use 
delegation as a tool to accomplish this challenge. Delegation can allow them to 
deal with compliance monitoring, dispute resolution, and even the sanctioning 
of defecting states, thereby addressing the enforcement problem. It can also be 
used to address the commitment problem by increasing the extent to which the 
agreement “ties the hands” of signing states. The effect is larger for external 
delegation, perhaps because external organizations are seen as more neutral 
and credible than internal bodies,54 which may increase their effectiveness in 
overcoming cooperation problems. This would be the case especially when 
states are trying to solve commitment problems: a third party would be seen as 
more credible than the state itself when the state has voting power. (In terms of 
marginal effects, the presence of a complex problem increases the probability of 
external delegation by nearly forty percent and internal delegation by twenty-
one percent). 
 
Table 5: Results of Probit Analysis of Complexity and Delegation 
 
Dependent Variable 1 Dependent Variable 2 
Independent Variable 
External Delegation Internal Delegation 
Complex Problem 
1.14† 
(0.334) 
0.562* 
(0.303) 
Sample Size = 97 
Standard Errors are in Parentheses 
* p<0.1 
† p<0.01 
Note: “Complex Problem” is defined as Uncertainty about Behavior or the 
State of World, Enforcement Problem, or Commitment Problem 
 
B. Delegation and Number and Heterogeneity of Parties 
Rational Design theory predicts that delegation will increase with the 
number of states involved in a cooperative endeavor.55 Using the number of 
participants at the original negotiation of the agreement as a measure, the effect 
 
 54. See Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International 
Organizations, 42 J.  CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 16 (1998). 
 55. See supra Part II. 
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number has on the choice of delegation can be analyzed by performing a probit 
regression. Table 6 illustrates the results.56 
 
Table 6: Results of Probit Analysis of Number of Parties and Delegation 
 
Dependent Variable 1 Dependent Variable 2 
Independent Variable 
External Delegation Internal Delegation 
Number of Parties 
(logged) 
0.541† 
(0.128) 
0.078 
(0.107) 
Sample Size = 97 
Standard Errors are in Parentheses 
† p<0.01 
 
Table 6 illustrates a positive and significant relationship between number and 
external delegation only. With respect to marginal effects, as the number of 
parties changes from two to three, the probability of external delegation 
increases by eight percent, whereas the probability of internal delegation 
increases only by 1.2%.57 
According to the theory articulated above, delegation should increase with 
the heterogeneity of the parties.58 The narrower argument is that delegation will 
be used increasingly to solve disputes as states’ preferences become more 
diverse. This prediction constrasts directly with that by Hawkins et al., which 
states, “The greater the preference heterogeneity of any group of states, 
therefore, the less likely they will be to delegate to an [international 
organization].”59 
Table 7 shows some simple probit results from the perspective of the 
relationship between the heterogeneity of members and delegation.60 
 
 56. A log of the number of participants is used, since the unlogged variable is highly right-skewed 
and its log is almost perfectly normally distributed. 
 57. I selected two parties since sixty-four of the treaties are bilateral and hence a one-unit increase 
is standard. Then I took the natural log of 2 and 3 to perform the calculations. 
 58. See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 
257, 273 (1974) (“For example, as suggested earlier, we expect (and observe) more delegation of 
legislative power by the United States Congress than by the British Parliament because the costs of 
producing legislation are lower under the parliamentary system with its well disciplined parties and its 
effectively unicameral legislature.”). 
 59. Darren G. Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and 
Principal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 3, 21 
(Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006). 
 60. Gartzke and Jo’s “Affinity of Nations Index,” which measures the similarity in states’ 
preferences based on voting preferences in the United Nations General Assembly, is used as a measure 
of heterogeneity. Eric Gartzke & Dong-Joon Jo, The Affinity of Nations Index, 1946-1996, Nov. 8, 2002, 
htttp://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke. Because the Affinity data are dyadic, I simply take the Affinity value for 
each bilateral agreement. For the multilateral agreements, I first create a dyad for each pair of 
signatories. Hence, if there are three signatories, there are three dyads; if there are four signatories, 
there are six dyads, and so on. For each multilateral agreement, the “weakest link assumption” is used, 
taking the Affinity value of the dyad with the least similar interests. 
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Table 7: Results of Probit Analysis of Heterogeneity of Members and 
Delegation 
 
Dependent Variable 1 Dependent Variable 2 
Independent Variable 
External Delegation Internal Delegation 
Heterogeneity 
1.295† 
(0.307) 
0.418* 
(0.254) 
Sample Size = 91 (Affinity data are not available for all agreements) 
Standard Errors are in Parentheses 
* p<0.1 
† p<0.01 
 
As Table 7 illustrates, there does seem to be a positive relationship between 
heterogeneity and both kinds of delegation, with the effect on external 
delegation being larger and more significant, as predicted in the theory section 
above. Substantively, a change in the heterogeneity of parties from a middle 
level of zero to a high level of one increases the probability of external 
delegation by nearly fifty percent; the same change in heterogeneity increases 
the probability of internal delegation by only twelve percent. 
When both heterogeneity and number of parties are included in the probit 
analysis, as in Table 8, the significance of both of these variables for external 
delegation remains high. This implies that both heterogeneity and number of 
parties have independent effects on the choice of external delegation. 
 
Table 8: Results of Probit Analysis of Heterogeneity and Number of Parties and 
Delegation 
 
Dependent Variable 1 Dependent Variable 2 
Independent Variables 
External Delegation Internal Delegation 
Heterogeneity 
0.837‡ 
(0.369) 
0.456 
(0.32) 
Number of Parties 
0.424‡ 
(0.176) 
-0.028 
(0.150) 
Sample Size = 91 
Standard Errors are in Parentheses 
‡ p<0.05 
 
Substantively, when controlling for the number of parties, the effect of a 
change in the heterogeneity of members from zero to one on the probability of 
external delegation decreases slightly to thirty-one percent, while it leaves the 
marginal effect of heterogeneity on the probability of internal delegation nearly 
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unchanged. In addition, controlling for heterogeneity slightly reduces the effect 
of the number of parties on the probability of external delegation to 6.5%, 
while the number of parties, controlling for heterogeneity, does not affect the 
probability of internal delegation.61 
The results in Tables 6–8 confirm the prediction that larger and more 
heterogeneous groups of states are more likely to choose external rather than 
internal delegation. 
C. Other Possible Explanatory Variables 
Other explanatory variables (democracy, the presence of a superpower, and 
the member states’ level of risk aversion), while not stemming from Rational 
Design, are common control variables in empirical analyses of international 
relations.62 Democracy is measured by the mean polity score of treaty 
signatories.63  As Table 9 illustrates, both forms of delegation are less common 
when the parties are democracies than when they are not. 
 
Table 9: Results of Probit Analysis of Democracy and Delegation 
Dependent Variable 1 Dependent Variable 2 
Independent Variable 
External Delegation Internal Delegation 
Democracy 
(Polity score) 
-0.100† 
(0.032) 
-0.069‡ 
(0.031) 
Sample Size = 97 
Standard Errors are in Parentheses 
‡ p<0.05 
† p<0.01 
 
More concretely, as the average level of democracy among parties to an 
agreement changes from zero (representing a relatively heterogeneous group of 
members) to ten (representing an agreement in which all the members are 
democracies), the probability of external delegation decreases by thirty-seven 
percent and the probability of internal delegation decreases by twenty-five 
percent. 
What might explain this striking finding? One possible explanation is that 
these findings may relate to those on heterogeneity: when more signing states 
 
 61. Marginal effect of heterogeneity is calculated holding number of parties (logged) at its mean 
(1.437) and the marginal effect of the number of parties is found holding heterogeneity at its mean (-
0.309). 
 62. It could be argued that the presence of a superpower partly captures the asymmetry of power 
that is part of the variable, number, in rational design. Nonetheless, this is an imperfect measure at best. 
Some quantification of the power of the other signatories would be needed so that a measure of the 
discrepancy in power among agreement members could be created. 
 63. “Polity” is one of the most widely used measures of democracy. Among the dimensions of 
democracy captured in Polity are chief-executive constraints and the competitiveness of political 
participation. 
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are democracies, perhaps they are also more homogeneous, with similar 
preferences and similar interests. One way of investigating this possibility is to 
look at the correlation coefficient between the two variables, democracy and 
heterogeneity. It turns out that the correlation is -0.3552, with a p-value of 0.006 
(and thus statistically significant); hence democracies are quite homogeneous, at 
least in terms of the measure used here, which is similar voting patterns in the 
United Nations General Assembly. Still, there are other possible explanations. 
It may be that democracies are more able to use informal mechanisms in their 
cooperation. Finally, perhaps democracies worry more than nondemocracies 
about the democratic values that international delegations might compromise—
for example, participation, accountability, and responsiveness.64 In any event, 
more in-depth research is needed to explain this finding. 
Considered next is whether the presence of a superpower among the 
signatories affects the probability of having external or internal delegation.65 A 
superpower may be reluctant to delegate authority and reduce its autonomy. 
Yet a superpower signatory does not significantly change the probability of 
either type of delegation. In addition, the substantive effect of a superpower 
signatory is very small for both external and internal delegation. Having the 
United States or another superpower like the former Soviet Union as a 
signatory increases the probability of external delegation by two percent, while 
it reduces the probability of internal delegation by ten percent. 
Finally, anarchy could make risk-averse states cautious about delegating, 
especially delegating important tasks such as monitoring, implementation, and 
dispute resolution. As early as James Madison, those writing about delegation 
have demonstrated that delegated power can be used against the principal 
delegating it.66 Of course, the development of delegation theory has focused on 
how contracts can be structured to minimize risks like agency slippage.67 The 
 
 64. See Neil Siegel, International Delegations and the Values of Federalism, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 93 (Winter 2008). 
 65. The superpower variable is equal to one if the U.S. or the USSR was a signatory and zero 
otherwise. 
 66. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison) (arguing that the legislative process is constructed 
to include an executive and a bicameral legislative branch in order to limit “excess law-making” which 
can result through delegation). His point is that delegation can be dangerous when it makes policy 
change and the construction of new laws too easy since this can lead to an abuse of power. 
 67. The literature has dealt with the issue of constraining agent “slippage” by emphasizing that the 
preferences of the agent and the principal are seldom aligned. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 30 (1985). 
The principal may, therefore, choose or construct an agent that has similar preferences. DARREN G. 
HAWKINS & WADE JACOBY, How Agents Matter, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 199–228 (David A. Lake et al. eds., 2006). Principals may also do this by limiting the 
powers or mandate of the institution or by restricting the specialization of the agent to limit 
opportunism. EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLPH RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY: 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 265–81 (2000); RODERICK D. 
KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION 25 (1991).  
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bottom line, however, is that tradeoffs are inherently involved.68 The traditional 
view, in summary, is that “[t]he potential for inferior outcomes, loss of 
authority, and diminution of sovereignty makes states reluctant to accept hard 
legalization—especially when it includes significant levels of delegation.”69 Thus, 
states facing enforcement problems are less likely to include delegated dispute-
resolution provisions in their international agreements. Moreover, since 
external delegation may be harder for states to control, and thus imply more 
risk, this effect is likely to be larger for external delegation than for internal 
delegation. 
The four different probit analyses test the relationship between risk aversion 
and delegation overall as well as the delegation of monitoring, implementation, 
and dispute resolution.70 Risk aversion and delegation do not appear to be 
significantly related, except in the case of the internal delegation of dispute-
resolution provisions, suggesting that states seek the benefits they can derive 
from delegation despite the risks involved. In other words, states are not single-
mindedly avoiding risk as many Realists would predict; rather, they make 
tradeoffs based on cost-benefit calculations. Still, a more fine-grained analysis is 
called for once a greater data set allows it. For example, among other things, 
one would need to look into whether states can opt out of the delegated dispute 
resolution by adding reservations to the agreements.71 
D. Relationship Between Delegation and Other Design Provisions 
Examining the relationship between delegation and other design provisions 
logically begins by describing other work that has been pursued on the 
relationship between delegation of dispute resolution and the degree of 
precision of an agreement’s main substantive goals. 
 
 68. For classic statements reflecting this view, see generally Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 775, 775–95 (1972); 
Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 288–307 (1980). 
 69. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 
INT’L ORG. 421, 437 (2000). 
 70. All of these analyses use Bueno de Mesquita’s risk-attitude measure, which uses a state’s 
alliance portfolio to determine its level of risk aversion. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap 
Revisited: A Revised Expected Utility Model, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 156, 158–59 (1985). Specifically, the 
closer a state is to having an alliance portfolio that maximizes its security, the more risk-averse it is 
presumed to be. In EUGene (Expected Utility Generation and Data Management Program), this risk 
attitude variable ranges from –1 (very risk-averse) to +1 (very risk-acceptant) and is based on region. 
See generally Scott D. Bennett & Allan C. Stam, A Universal Test of an Expected Utility Theory of War, 
44 INT’L STUD. Q. 451 (2000). To measure risk attitudes in bilateral treaties, I calculate each signatory’s 
risk attitude towards the other’s region. For multilateral treaties, I find the mean of each signatory’s 
regional risk scores. I use a “weakest link” assumption, and measure the agreement as a function of the 
risk attitude of the most risk-averse signatory. Finally, I invert the scale to create a measure of risk-
aversion with –1 being the least risk-averse and +1 being the most risk-averse. 
 71. In fact, whether states are prohibited or not from adding reservations is another facet of 
institutional design that deserves further study. 
06__KOREMENOS.DOC 6/9/2008  8:04:12 AM 
Winter  2008] WHEN STATES DELEGATE 175 
1. Delegation and Precision 
Delegation of dispute-resolution authority in an international agreement 
should be inversely related to the degree of precision accorded to the 
agreement’s substantive goals.72 A bivariate probit model indeed reveals a 
statistically significant inverse relationship between these two design variables. 
Moreover, consistent with the results above, the variable complex cooperation 
problem has a positive and significant effect on dispute-resolution delegation 
provisions. 73 
2. Delegation and Withdrawal Clauses 
There are several hypotheses for why the use of delegation may be 
associated with the use of withdrawal clauses. In their article, Bradley and 
Kelley capture the notion of withdrawal clauses by considering the permanence 
of the delegated body and whether it is easy or difficult for states to remove 
themselves from the jurisdiction of the delegated body or the associated 
agreement, or both.74 They suggest that even the existence of withdrawal clauses 
might not remove the practical difficulty of removing oneself from an 
agreement or from part of an agreement, especially if one agreement is 
embedded within others as is the case for the European Convention on Rights 
and the Council of Europe.75 
On the other hand, in her paper for this symposium, Hathaway argues that 
withdrawal clauses may serve to protect states against time-inconsistent 
preferences—that is, cases in which state preferences change over time.76 Such 
clauses allow states to remove themselves from forms of delegation that they 
find increasingly counter to their revised interests. This is very similar to the 
Koremenos argument that “[w]ithdrawal clauses are responses to shocks that 
alter a state’s basic interest in cooperation.”77 These shocks are rare, but the risk 
they impose is great. Hence withdrawal clauses are pervasive, but not used very 
frequently.78 In this sense, withdrawal clauses play a role similar to that of 
provisions that allow states to revoke authority from a delegated body or to 
remove themselves from its jurisdiction. They provide flexibility and preserve a 
 
 72. Koremenos, supra note 39, passim (drawing on Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 58). This 
challenges the special issue on legalization, Legalization and World Politics, which does not suggest that 
these two design dimensions are substitutes. See Judith Goldstein et al., Legalization and World 
Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 385 (2000). 
 73. This is consistent with Koremenos, Which Half, supra note 8, at 207–09. Ehrlich & Posner, 
supra note 58, also predict that greater heterogeneity across parties will lead to less precise contracts 
and therefore greater delegation of dispute resolution authority. 
 74. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 1, at 24. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Oona A. Hathaway, International Delegation and State Sovereignty, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 115 (Winter 2008). 
 77. Barbara Koremenos, Contracting Around International Uncertainty, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 549, 
561 (2005). 
 78. Id. 
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degree of state independence. As a result, one would expect to see withdrawal 
clauses in treaties that also include delegation, particularly external delegation. 
Table 10 illustrates a significant and positive correlation between delegation 
provisions and withdrawal clauses. What this suggests is that delegation is not 
trivial for states; rather, it impedes their autonomy. Hence, agreements that call 
for delegation, in particular external delegation, are far more likely to include 
withdrawal provisions than those that do not. 
 
Table 10: Correlation Between Withdrawal Clause and Delegation 
 
 External Delegation Internal Delegation 
Withdrawal Clause 0.4112† 0.2083* 
Sample Size = 97 
*  p<0.1 
†  p<0.01 
3. Delegation and Finite Duration Provisions 
Duration provisions provide a form of insurance against shocks that may 
influence how an agreement affects state interests.79 Because external 
delegation may give some real power to an external body, states may perceive a 
higher degree of uncertainty regarding the possible outcomes of such an 
agreement that includes delegation. As a result, signing parties may be more 
interested in including a finite duration clause as protection against a shock due 
to some unexpected action by the delegated body. Although this may be true of 
internal delegation to some extent, it is more likely with external delegation. On 
the other hand, bodies, whether external or internal, may be able to provide the 
kind of flexibility desired by states when faced with such uncertainty. The 
bodies can be delegated the authority to adjust the terms of cooperation in 
response to shocks. If this is the case, delegation could be a substitute for finite 
duration provisions. 
The data in Table 11 provide an insight into which of these possible 
explanations seems more supported. 
 
Table 11: Correlation Between Finite Duration and Delegation 
 
 External Delegation Internal Delegation 
Finite Duration -0.174* -0.034 
Sample Size = 97 
* p<0.1 
‡ p<0.05 
† p<0.01 
 
 79. Id. at 549. 
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The results suggest that agreements that include external delegation are less 
likely to have finite duration, supporting the latter argument that these bodies 
actually provide some desired flexibility. The correlation between internal 
delegation and finite duration is nearly zero and is statistically insignificant, 
leading to the conclusion that there is no relationship between the two. 
E. Multivariate Analysis 
As Tables 12 and 13 demonstrate, in the multivariate regression, all the 
variables explaining external delegation remain correctly signed, and only 
heterogeneity loses statistical significance across both dependent variables.80  
This is not surprising, since the sample size is relatively small. Controlling for 
heterogeneity, complexity, and democracy, the number of parties still predicts 
more external delegation. Substantively, a change from two to three parties 
increases the probability of external delegation by seven percent. This lends 
additional support to the argument that parties use delegation to reduce 
transaction costs, giving more confidence to the Rational Design conjecture that 
centralization increases with number. The effect of the number of parties on 
internal delegation, although negative, is very small and statistically 
insignificant, all other things being equal. If the underlying cooperation 
problem is complex, the probability of external delegation increases by thirty-
six percent, and the probability of internal delegation increases by seventeen 
percent, holding everything else constant. This result is very strong with respect 
to external delegation, lending strong support to the Rational Design 
hypotheses linking complex cooperation problems to centralization. The change 
in democracy lowers the probability of both external and internal delegation by 
about thirty-two percent, holding everything else constant. 
 
 
 80. The correlation between number (logged participants) and heterogeneity is 0.6426†, whereas 
between democracy (Polity mean) and number (logged participants) it is -0.3363†. 
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Table 12: Multivariate Analysis 
 
Dependent Variable 1 Dependent Variable 2 
Independent Variable 
External Delegation Internal Delegation 
Heterogeneity 
0.549 
(0.411) 
0.254 
(0.347) 
Number of Parties 
(logged) 
0.410‡ 
(0.193) 
-0.095 
(0.156) 
Complex Problem 
1.075† 
(0.396) 
0.448 
(0.322) 
Democracy 
(Polity score) 
-0.085* 
(0.040) 
-0.085‡ 
(0.035) 
Sample Size = 91 
Standard Errors are in Parentheses 
* p<0.1 
‡ p<0.05 
† p<0.01 
 
Table 13: Marginal Effects: Multivariate Results 
 
 Change in Probability of 
External Delegation 
(95% confidence 
interval) 
Change in Probability 
of Internal Delegation 
(95% confidence 
interval) 
Change of 
Heterogeneity from 0 to 
1 
0.157 
(-0.101, 0.322) 
0.091 
(-0.167, 0.286) 
Change of Number of 
Parties from 2 to 3 
0.066 
(0.009, 0.126) 
-0.015 
(-0.063, 0.032) 
Change in Complex 
Problem from 0 to 1 
0.359 
(0.116, 0.556) 
0.167 
(-0.064, 0.369) 
Change in the Mean 
Democracy from 0 to 10 
-0.322 
(-0.574, 0.032) 
-0.318 
(-0.525, -0.075) 
Note: For each marginal effect, the other variables where held at either their 
mean or mode for binary variables (for example, complex problem). 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
This article takes a first, systematic look at the incidence of delegation 
across a random sample of agreements. Not only is delegation widespread; 
these results also confirm the observable implications of the Rational Design 
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project, which were deduced and articulated five years earlier—long before any 
of the current data had been collected. This article is therefore a contribution to 
a broader research agenda on rational institutional design as well as on 
international delegation. 
A number of interesting empirical findings stand out. For example, states 
delegate the least in the security issue area, but when they do delegate, they 
tend to use external delegation almost twice as much as internal delegation. 
More theoretical and empirical work needs to be done to explain such findings. 
For instance, do state representatives in security agreements feel that when they 
must delegate, they want a more neutral third party to lessen the risk of any 
conflict escalation? Another striking finding is how little states use unanimity or 
even supermajority voting rules to protect themselves or to limit delegated 
authority. 
Additionally, the findings on heterogeneity leading to less delegation 
contrast with the predictions in the work of Hawkins et al.81 The predictions 
presented here are theoretically based on the work of Erhlich and Posner, who 
focus on dispute resolution.82 The findings are based on data concerning all 
forms of delegation, including the delegation of dispute resolution, and across 
four issue areas, whereas the work of Hawkins et al. focuses on a particular kind 
of delegation: the implementation of policy. 
The analyses in this article all focus on the internal–external delegation 
distinction. This distinction is warranted, given the statistically significant 
differences between the two types of delegation in the analyses presented here. 
Bradley and Kelley suggest that there are significant differences among 
international delegations beyond the internal–external distinction.83 Empirically, 
with a larger number of agreements in the sample, researchers can begin to 
break down the analyses and probe what kind of delegation is present in each 
issue area as well as investigate the voting rules and the particular 
characteristics of the states involved. 
Another interesting analysis that would be possible with a larger data set is 
to match specific cooperation problems with various kinds of delegation, 
including the external–internal distinction, and to probe whether the prediction 
in Hawkins et al.84 on the delegation of policy implementation holds up across a 
larger set of agreements. The initial results in this article show that such future 
research is promising and should be conducted. 
Additionally, as more data become available, multivariate and interactive 
analyses should be employed to achieve not only a greater level of certainty 
about the relative importance of delegation for different cooperation problems, 
but also a more sophisticated understanding of under what conditions which 
particular tasks will be delegated. 
 
 81. Hawkins et al., supra note 59, at 21. 
 82. See generally Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 58. 
 83. See Bradley & Kelley, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
 84. Hawkins et al., supra note 59, at 21. 
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Finally, increasing the sample will also allow a time-series analysis. This is 
not trivial, given that one set of questions we can then study will be the effects 
of the bipolar world on delegation and membership in those agreements that 
call for delegation. For instance, the bipolar world may have inhibited 
widespread and deep delegation to global organizations; on the other hand, 
perhaps the bodies that were created during the Cold War were narrow in terms 
of membership but called for substantial delegation. So, polarity (whether the 
world be bipolar as it used to be or unipolar as it is now) may affect the scope 
and depth of delegation as well as the nature of problems resolved through 
international institutions. Another issue that could then be addressed is whether 
states increased the amount or depth of delegation to NGOs. 
These are significant questions that need to be addressed, and the expansion 
of datasets like the one used in this paper will help uncover new puzzles and 
provide convincing empirical evidence about the changes occurring in the 
international environment as a result of the rise in nonstate actors as well as of 
the demise of the Cold War. 
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APPENDIX: 
TABLES OF AGREEMENTS IN 
THE RANDOM SAMPLE ORGANIZED BY SUBJECT 
 
TABLE A-1 
FINANCE AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE 
Agreement Signatories Signature Date Units # 
Agreement concerning financial 
cooperation on the Lake Volta 
Transport System. 
Federal Rep. 
Germany–Ghana 
1980 21671 
Convention for the avoidance of 
double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on income. 
Japan–United Arab 
Rep. 
1968 10576 
Convention for the avoidance of 
double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on income. 
Belgium–United 
Kingdom 
1953 2526 
Reciprocal Trade Agreement. 
United States–
Mexico 
1942 81 
Agreement concerning financial 
cooperation. 
Fed. Rep. 
Germany–
Bangladesh 
1986 25472 
Agreement for the avoidance of 
double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on income and 
capital gains. 
United Kingdom–
Barbados 
1970 10955 
Convention for the avoidance of 
double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on income. 
Australia–Italy 1982 25393 
Agreement concerning the 
disposition of certain accounts 
in Thailand under Article 16 of 
the Treaty of Peace with Japan 
of 8 September 1951. 
Multilateral 1953 2913 
Exchange of notes constituting 
an agreement concerning the 
delivery of a linear accelerator 
to the Cancer Institute. 
Denmark–India 1975 14491 
Agreement concerning financial 
cooperation. 
Fed. Rep. 
Germany–Niger 
1978 20214 
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Agreement for financing certain 
educational exchange programs. 
United States–
Ecuador 
1956 4114 
Agreement concerning the 
collection of bills, drafts, et 
cetera. 
Multilateral 1964 8851 
Agreement concerning the 
compensation of Netherlands’ 
interests. 
Netherlands–Egypt 1971 11868 
Convention for the avoidance of 
double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on income and 
on capital (with protocol). 
Czechoslovakia–
Norway 
1979 18930 
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TABLE A-2 
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE 
Agreement Signatories Signature Date Units # 
Agreement for the promotion 
and protection of investments. 
United Kingdom–
Yemen 
1982 22810 
Agreement concerning financial 
assistance. 
Fed. Rep. of 
Germany–Tanzania 
1974 14366 
Foreign Investment Insurance 
Agreement. 
Canada–Senegal 1979 24875 
Agreement for the promotion 
and protection of investments. 
United Kingdom–
Panama 
1983 24700 
Convention concerning the 
mutual promotion and 
protection of investments. 
France–Syrian Arab 
Rep. 
1978 19570 
Treaty on the encouragement 
and reciprocal protection of 
investments of capital. 
Fed. Rep. 
Germany–Benin 
1978 24681 
Exchange of notes constituting 
an agreement relating to the 
guaranty of private investments. 
United States–
Nicaragua 
1959 4922 
Exchange of letters constituting 
an agreement relating to 
investment guaranties. 
United States–
Colombia 
1962 6621 
Agreement for the promotion 
and protection of investments. 
United Kingdom–
Bangladesh 
1980 19536 
Agreement on the mutual 
protection of investments (with 
exchange of notes). 
Sweden–China 1982 22733 
Exchange of notes constituting 
an agreement relating to the 
guaranty of private investments. 
United Kingdom–
Liberia 
1960 5596 
Agreement for the promotion 
and protection of investments. 
United Kingdom–
Egypt 
1975 15181 
Exchange of notes constituting 
an agreement relating to 
investment guaranties. 
United States–
Zambia 
1966 8901 
Exchange of notes constituting 
an agreement relating to 
investment guaranties. 
United States–
Cameroon 
1967 9855 
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Agreement on the mutual 
promotion and protection of 
investments (with exchange of 
letters). 
France–Haiti 1984 24323 
Convention concerning the 
encouragement of capital 
investment and the protection of 
property. 
Netherlands–
Tunisia 
1963 7558 
Agreement on processing and 
protection of investments (with 
exchange of letters). 
France–Panama 1982 24235 
Agreement concerning the 
encouragement and reciprocal 
protection of investments. 
Denmark–Sri 
Lanka 
1985 23607 
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TABLE A-3 
MONETARY AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE 
Agreement Name Signatories Signature Date Units # 
Exchange of notes constituting 
an agreement concerning the 
guarantee by the government of 
the United Kingdom and the 
maintenance of the Minimum 
Sterling Proportion by the 
Government of Iceland. 
Iceland–United 
Kingdom 
1961 9800 
Agreement concerning 
settlement of the “Special Yen 
Problem.” 
Japan–Thailand 1955 3172 
Exchange of notes constituting 
an agreement concerning the 
guarantee by the government of 
the United Kingdom and the 
maintenance of the Minimum 
Sterling Proportion by the 
Government of Libya. 
Libya–United 
Kingdom 
1968 9815 
Exchange of notes constituting 
an agreement regarding the 
guarantee by the government of 
the United Kingdom and the 
maintenance of the Minimum 
Sterling Proportion by Ireland. 
Belgium–United 
Kingdom 
1947 9374 
Exchange of notes and 
monetary agreement. 
Netherlands–
United Kingdom 
1945 24 
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TABLE A-4 
TRADE AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE 
Agreement Name Signatories Signature Date Units # 
Exchange of notes constituting 
an agreement concerning grain 
to be supplied by the 
government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain to the 
government of Mali within the 
framework of the Cereals Food 
Aid Programme of the 
European Economic 
Community. 
Mali–United 
Kingdom 
1975 14430 
Agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities. 
Dominican 
Republic–United 
States 
1968 10249 
Agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities. 
Bangladesh–United 
States 
1973 13092 
Agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities. 
Republic of 
Vietnam–United 
States 
1972 12254 
Agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities. 
Paraguay–United 
States 
1970 11046 
Agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities. 
Egypt–United 
States 
1974 13629 
International Sugar Agreement, 
1973 (with annexes). 
Multilateral 1973 12951 
Agricultural Commodities 
Agreement under Title I of the 
Agricultural Trade 
Development and Assistance 
Act (with agreed minutes and 
Memorandum of 
Understanding). 
Israel–United 
States 
1957 4365 
Agreement for the sale of 
agricultural commodities (with 
minutes of negotiations of 20 
March 1978). 
Lebanon–United 
States 
1978 18143 
Agreement with respect to 
quality wheat. 
Multilateral 1962 6389 
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TABLE A-5 
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE 
Agreement Name Signatories Signature Date Units # 
Agreement concerning financial 
cooperation—refuse disposal in 
the Freetown Metropolitan 
Area. 
Fed. Rep. of 
Germany–Sierra 
Leone 
1980 21678 
Exchange of notes constituting 
an agreement on the project soil 
management and conservation 
in East Amazonia. 
Brazil–Fed. Rep. of 
Germany 
1984 23031 
Agreement on cooperation in 
the field of environmental 
protection. 
German 
Democratic 
Republic–Sweden 
1976 20644 
Agreement on cooperation in 
the field of environmental 
protection (with agreed 
minutes). 
Japan–United 
States 
1975 15109 
Agreement concerning the 
protection of frontier forests 
against fire. 
Argentina–Chile 1961 9075 
Community-Cost Concentration 
Agreement on a concerted 
action project in the field of 
analysis of organic 
micropollutants in water. 
Multilateral 1980 20754 
Exchange of letters constituting 
an agreement concerning the 
free passage of salmon in 
Vanern Lake. 
Norway–Sweden 1969 14017 
International Convention (with 
annexes) for the Prevention of 
Pollution of the Sea by Oil. 
Multilateral 1954 4714 
Memorandum of Understanding 
on cooperation in earth sciences 
and environmental studies. 
United Kingdom–
United States 
1979 19699 
Agreement for plant 
protection—Sudan quelea bird 
research project. 
Sudan–United 
States 
1977 17308 
Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas. 
Multilateral 1958 8164 
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Agreement on cooperation in 
the field of environmental 
protection. 
United Kingdom–
USSR 
1974 13920 
African Migratory Locust 
Convention. 
Multilateral 1952 10476 
International Convention on 
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage. 
Multilateral 1969 14097 
International Convention for 
the Conservation of Atlantic 
Tunas (with Final Act and 
Resolution adopted by the 
Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries). 
Multilateral 1966 9587 
Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living 
Resources in the Baltic Sea and 
the Belts. 
Multilateral 1973 16710 
Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution. 
Multilateral 1979 21623 
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TABLE A-6 
HUMAN RIGHTS AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE 
Agreement Name Signatories Signature Date Units # 
Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide. 
Multilateral 1948 1021 
Convention on the non-
applicability of statutory 
limitations to war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. 
Multilateral 1968 10823 
OAU Convention governing the 
specific aspects of refugee 
problems in Africa. 
Multilateral 1969 14691 
Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. 
Multilateral 1950 2889 
International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. 
Multilateral 1966 14668 
Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine. 
Multilateral 1997 N/A 
Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Crimes 
against Internationally 
Protected Persons, including 
Diplomatic Agents. 
Multilateral 1973 15410 
Agreement on the fundamental 
rights of nationals. 
Congo–France 1974 21833 
Protocol relating to refugee 
seamen. 
Multilateral 1973 13928 
International Convention on the 
Suppression and Punishment of 
the Crime of Apartheid. 
Multilateral 1973 14861 
Convention (with Final 
Protocol) concerning the 
reciprocal grant of assistance to 
distressed persons. 
Multilateral 1951 2647 
Convention (No. 19) concerning 
equality of treatment for 
national and foreign workers as 
regards workmen’s 
compensation for accidents. 
Multilateral 1925 602 
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Convention (No. 98) concerning 
the application of the principles 
of the right to organize and to 
bargain collectively. 
Multilateral 1949 1341 
Constitution of the International 
Refugee Organization and 
agreement on interim measures 
to be taken in respect of 
refugees and displaced persons. 
Multilateral 1946 283 
American Convention on 
Human Rights Pact of San José, 
Costa Rica. 
Multilateral 1969 17955 
Convention (No. 143) 
concerning migrations in 
abusive conditions and the 
promotion of equality of 
opportunity and treatment of 
migrant workers. 
Multilateral 1975 17426 
Convention of establishment. France–Mali 1977 20762 
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TABLE A-7 
SECURITY AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE 
Agreement Name Signatories Signature Date Units # 
Convention on the prohibition 
of the development, production, 
and stockpiling of 
bacteriological (biological) and 
toxin weapons and on their 
destruction. 
Multilateral 1972 14860 
Convention on prohibitions or 
restrictions on the use of certain 
conventional weapons which 
may be deemed to be 
excessively injurious or to have 
indiscriminate effects. 
Multilateral 1980 22495 
Treaty on the prohibition of the 
emplacement of nuclear 
weapons and other weapons of 
mass destruction on the seabed 
and the ocean floor and in the 
subsoil thereof. 
Multilateral 1971 13678 
Interim Agreement on certain 
measures with respect to the 
limitation of strategic offensive 
arms. 
USSR–United 
States 
1972 13445 
Convention on the prohibition 
of military or any other hostile 
use of environmental 
modification techniques. 
Multilateral 1976 17119 
Agreement governing the 
activities of states on the moon 
and other celestial bodies. 
Multilateral 1979 23002 
Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin 
America (with annexed 
Additional Protocols I and II). 
Multilateral 1967 9068 
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Exchange of notes constituting 
an agreement relating to 
military assistance: eligibility 
requirement pursuant to the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 
and the International Security 
Assistance and Arms Export 
Control Act of 1976. 
Greece–United 
States 
1976 16035 
Exchange of notes constituting 
an agreement relating to 
assurances under the Mutual 
Security Act of 1951. 
Portugal–United 
States 
1952 2799 
Exchange of notes constituting 
an agreement relating to 
military assistance: eligibility 
requirements pursuant to the 
International Security 
Assistance and Arms Export 
Control Act of 1976. 
Malaysia–United 
States 
1977 17310 
Exchange of notes constituting 
an agreement relating to mutual 
security. 
Belgium–United 
States 
1952 2356 
Cooperation agreement on civil 
defense and security. 
France–Morocco 1981 20783 
Exchange of notes constituting 
and agreement relating to 
mutual security. 
Luxembourg–
United States 
1952 2384 
Exchange of notes constituting 
an agreement relating to mutual 
security. 
Italy–United States 1952 2365 
Exchange of notes constituting 
an agreement relating to mutual 
security. 
Turkey–United 
States 
1952 2361 
Security Agreement concerning 
certain exchanges of secret 
information. 
France–Sweden 1973 14951 
 
